Although the management school has been highly influential in the international cooperation literature, the explanatory power of Chayes and Chayes' three explanations of noncompliance with international treaties remain understudied. Having developed a framework for examining the explanatory power of treaty ambiguity, lack of state capacity, and unexpected social or economic developments, this paper conducts a rigorous empirical test in the context of a well- 
Introduction
How can we account for noncompliance with international environmental agreements (IEAs)?
In their seminal 1 article "On Compliance," Chayes and Chayes (1993) formulate their version of the management school. 2 They argue that "compliance problems often do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking on the basis of a calculation of interests" (Chayes and Chayes 1993: 176) . Rather, noncompliance is usually caused by (one or more of) three factors beyond the control of national authorities: Treaty ambiguity, lack of state capacity, and what Chayes and Chayes refer to as "the temporal dimension" -unexpected changes of conditions for compliance following social and economic developments between commitment and implementation.
The compliance debate gained momentum during the 1990s and early 2000s; however, this progress was driven more by theoretical contributions than by empirical advances. Raustiala and Slaughter (2002: 548) argue that "compliance remains a relatively young field" and that "empirical testing of compliance theories is limited". Raustiala and Slaughter's statements still ring true.
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The present paper makes several contributions to the literature on compliance with IEAs. First, I develop a framework for assessing the explanatory power of treaty ambiguity, lack of state capacity, and unexpected social or economic developments. In particular, Chayes and Chayes' third explanation of noncompliance remains severely understudied. Based on this framework, I conduct a set of rigorous empirical tests in the context of a well-suited case -the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol.
Second, the present paper differs from previous studies in that I statistically control for the ambitiousness of the participating countries' commitments (i.e., the size of the required emissions reductions). Failing to control for ambitiousness entails a risk of biased results -a risk that is often overlooked (Raustiala 2005 , Downs et al. 1996 .
Third, unlike both Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1998) and Breitmeier et al. (2006) , I measure compliance on the ratio level. Exceeding an emissions target by only 1% is indeed less problematic than exceeding it by 10 or 20%, and the compliance variable should indeed reflect such variance. 4 Finally, my study further differs from Breitmeier et al. (2006) in that I measure each state's compliance level (rather than the general compliance with a regime at large).
The case of the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol is well suited for the development of a framework to empirically assess the explanatory power of the management school. First, because the protocol includes national emissions targets for four pollutants, compliance can be measured precisely. Precise measurement of the dependent variable is a prerequisite for the kind of statistical analyses I conduct when I assess the effect of state capacity on compliance. Second, assessing whether compliance has been affected by unexpected social and/or economic developments between commitment and implementation (Chayes and Chayes' third explanation) is certainly challenging: Ideally, it requires data on how states believed the future would look like when they entered the protocol. However, Gothenburg is part of an international cooperative effort with a strong scientific basis (Castells and Ravetz 2001 , Rensvik 2017 , Tuinstra 2008 ). Much energy has been devoted to modeling past and future environmental quality, emissions, and emissions drivers. Such projections were important when Gothenburg's emissions targets were agreed (see Kelly et al. 2010) . Therefore, I use projections of future emissions drivers to assess if compliance proved be more difficult to reach than the member states expected when they entered Gothenburg.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, I briefly present the Gothenburg Protocol and the environmental problems it seeks to alleviate. Second, I elaborate on the debate between Chayes and Chayes' management school and its counterpart, the enforcement school. I also review previous attempts at testing these two schools' hypotheses against empirical evidence, and develop a set of hypotheses. Finally, focusing on (non)compliance with the Gothenburg Protocol, I assess the explanatory power of the management school. I
show that states have mutually consistent interpretations of the contents of the agreement, and that the protocol's language is unequivocal. (Miljødirektoratet 2015) . 7 Eutrophication, which increases algae growth and thereby harms other organisms, often stems from ammonia emissions. 8 NOx reacting with non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs) causes harmful ground-level ozone. 9 In accordance with Young's (1979) definition. 10 Hence, Table 1 does not engage with the highly challenging task of distinguishing between Mitchell's (2010: 147) two kinds of noncompliant behavior ("good-faith" and "intentional") or between his two kinds of typically involves measuring an IEA's ability to improve environmental quality or state behavior compared to a no-agreement counterfactual. However, establishing such counterfactuals is notoriously difficult (Helm and Sprinz 2000 , Hovi et al. 2003 , Young 2003 .
As demonstrated by Table 1 , 21 national emissions targets were not reached by the deadline, 2010. Ten of them were targets for NOX emissions, eight for ammonia, and three for NMVOC. All SO2 targets were reached by 2010. In seven instances of noncompliance, the target was exceeded by 10% or less. Six targets were exceeded by 10-20%, while another six were exceeded by 20-40%. compliant behavior ("coincidental" and "treaty-induced" compliance).
3 Theory, previous research, and hypotheses 3.1 Enforcement or management? Treaty design and sources of noncompliance The enforcement school (Downs et al. 1996 , Barrett 2003 , Aakre et al. 2016 argues that states comply only if their expected marginal cost of complying are lower (or equal to) expected marginal revenue. The enforcement school thus views noncompliance as a rational, self-interested actor's reaction to a given material incentive structure. The generally high compliance with international agreements (Henkin, 1968 ) is attributed to the shallowness of commitments (Downs et al. 1996: 382) In contrast, Chayes and Chayes (1993: 178) claim that sanctions are costly, inefficient, hard to sustain, and unnecessary. Their "managerial strategy" consists of softer measures: Monitoring and knowledge sharing, effective dispute settlement, building state capacity, and adjusting treaties in light of economic, technological, social, and political changes.
Managerialists argue that international society's anarchical structure is not as detrimental to cooperation as their opponents believe. The main reason is states' "general propensity" to comply -a tendency to sincerely try to act in accordance with international obligations: "In common experience, people, whether as a result of socialization or otherwise, accept that they are obligated to obey the law. So it is with states". In other words, states are largely norm-driven actors. And, in international relations, the norm is to do as agreed (Chayes and Chayes 1993: 178-185 . See also Henkin 1968 , Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 , Simmons 1998 , Simmons 2013 ).
Thus, whenever noncompliance occurs, the cause is usually not that cheating maximizes the individual state's private net benefit. Rather, the sources of noncompliance lie beyond the state's reach.
First, ambiguity may cause noncompliance. Chayes and Chayes (1993: 188-189) state that "Treaties (…) frequently do not provide determinate answers to specific disputed questions." Hence, "a zone of ambiguity within which it is difficult to say with precision what is permitted and what is forbidden" occurs.
Second, compliance might require more than parties can deliver. Scientific and technical competence, bureaucratic resources, and economy are the three constraining factors specified by Chayes (1993, 1995) .
Third, the "temporal dimension" might explain noncompliance. Chayes and Chayes (1993: 195) argue that "Significant changes in social or economic systems mandated by regulatory treaties take time to accomplish. Thus, a cross section at any particular moment in time may give a misleading picture of the state of compliance." The moment in time when compliance is assessed should therefore be chosen carefully. Furthermore, conditions for compliance may change between the moment when a commitment is made and the deadline for reaching the targets. If these changes are substantial, unexpected and difficult to control, they may affect states' compliance considerably.
Empirical studies of international environmental cooperation
Several large empirical studies have focused on international environmental cooperation and tested hypotheses derived from the management and enforcement schools. Breitmeier et al. (2006: 110-111) state that "neither the shallowness argument of Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996) nor the management school of Chayes and Chayes can explain patterns of compliance with international environmental regimes." Victor et al. (eds. 1998 ) focus on implementation and effectiveness of international environmental cooperation, and find that "some implementation failures are intentional" and that hard measures such as sanctions sometimes is necessary. Furthermore, they argue that "legally binding agreements often codify what is already under way," thereby supporting Downs et al.'s (1996) "shallowness claim" (Raustiala and Victor 1998: 662) .
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Similarly, previous studies of cooperation to reduce long-range transboundary air pollution have mainly focused on effectiveness (Levy 1993, Böhmelt and Vollenweider 2015) .
12 Wettestad (2012: 34) argues that much of the last decades' substantial emissions reductions are due to other factors than CLRTAP protocols. Helm and Sprinz (2000) find that the 1985
Helsinki and the 1988 Sofia protocols reduced emissions compared to the counterfactual scenario, although cooperation falls short of the collective optimum. That conclusion is supported by Bratberg et al.'s (2005) econometric analysis of Sofia participation. In contrast, Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005) find that Helsinki did not reduce participants' emissions.
What explanatory power have previous studies attributed to the three factors that, according to Chayes and Chayes, cause noncompliance? Concerning ambiguity and compliance, Breitmeier et al. (2006: 90-93 , see also their Table 3 .11) find that "the association between the precision of rules and compliance rates is positive but not strong." Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1998) 13 conclude similarly.
Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1998) and Breitmeier et al. (2006) offer divergent findings concerning capacity. The latter conclude that "[our data] do not confirm expectations about the role of capacity building," while the former find that administrative capacity is important.
Their differing findings may to some extent be explained by differences in research design and observational units: While Breitmeier et al. (2006) study the general compliance with a treaty or regime, the case studies included in Brown Weiss and Jacobson's (1998, eds.) assess individual states' compliance. Although four of the five treaties studied by Brown Weiss and 11 In contrast, Bernauer et al. (2013) find no support for the enforcement school's hypothesisis of a trade-off between depth and participation. 12 However, an assessment of previous CLRTAP protocols concluded that negotiation positions, implementation, and compliance (operationalized as emissions reductions) were reasonably well predicted by a model of states as unitary rational actors (Underdal 2000: 351-353) . 13 This anthology includes studies of eight states' (and the EU's) compliance with five international environmental treaties. Jacobson (1998, eds.) Likewise, if a lack of state capacity explains the observed noncompliance, we should find a positive effect of political capacity on compliance:
H2: The higher a state's capacity, the higher the (likelihood of) compliance.
Chayes and Chayes' third explanation suggests that time was too short to reach the targets that were not complied with. I examine how conditions crucial for compliance have developed. If these conditions have developed differently than the parties expected when the agreement was adopted -for instance if consumption of energy in 2010 was higher than projected in 1999 -the temporal dimension may account for noncompliance. authorities express views fully consistent with the statements from Germany's Umweltbundesamt.
It seems clear that ambiguity did not cause the noncompliance with the Gothenburg Protocol. The fact that compliant and noncompliant parties alike have mutually consistent interpretations of their obligations strengthens this conclusion.
5 Analysis: Can lack of capacity explain noncompliance?
In this section, I examine the effect of state capacity on compliance.
Operationalization
Being a highly contested concept, state capacity is challenging to measure (Hanson and Sigman 2013, Jänicke 1997 (2017), the Government Effectiveness indicator "reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies."
Second, I operationalize capacity as GDP per capita (logtransformed). 18 According to Chayes and Chayes (1993: 194) , economic wealth increases states' capacity for compliance.
Moreover, scholars seem to agree that states' bureaucratic resources and capabilities strongly depend on their general level of economic development (Chayes and Chayes 1995 , Jänicke 1997 , Jacobson and Brown Weiss 1998 Table 2 shows the results of six OLS regressions. In three regressions (Models 1-3), I operationalize capacity as Government Effectiveness. In the other three (Models 4-6), I operationalize capacity as (log) GDP per capita. Models 1 and 4, which include capacity as the only independent variable, show a negative and statistically significant effect of capacity on compliance. When I control for ambition level 20 Using the binary compliance variable is also warranted by the considerable over-compliance by several parties shown in Table 1 . Such over-compliance may suggest that the emissions levels were not primarily a result of deliberate efforts to reach the target. Regressions using the binary compliance variable do not estimate on that potentially irrelevant information. 21 A multilevel model is infeasible because of few (4) units on the state level. Likewise, estimating causal effects by using instrumental variables (Angrist and Pischke 2009 ) is infeasible since it is highly doubtful that any valid instrument Z exists for my variables (see Angrist and Pischke's (2009: 117) discussion of criteria for valid instrumental variables). Bratberg et al. (2005) estimate the effect of participation in CLRTAP agreements on emissions by employing the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator, thus comparing participants to nonparticipants. The DID technique is, however, less feasible when compliance is the dependent variable, since only states that participate in the agreement may comply (or defect).
(Models 2 and 5), the effect of capacity on compliance remains negative, but is no longer statistically significant. Models 3 and 6 add an Eastern Europe dummy variable that controls for geographical, historical, political, and economic ties between countries in Europe. When this dummy is added, the estimates for capacity and ambition level are similar to those of Models 2 and 5, except that the effect of (log) GDP per capita is once again significant (Model 6). Even though the models' explained variance is not crucial for the purpose of this paper, it is interesting to note that R 2 increases substantially when ambition level is included. Table 3 shows the results of six regressions corresponding to those in Table 2 , except that the dependent variable is dichotomous in Table 3 's models. The effects of capacity reported in Table 3 are consistently negative, although statistically insignificant in models 9 and 12. Thus, I do not find the positive effect of capacity on compliance with the Gothenburg Protocol expected by the management school (H2). The sensitivity checks reported in the appendix (Tables A1 and A2) show that this conclusion holds under a number of conditions.
The effect of capacity is consistently negative in models using a third operationalization of capacity as well as in models that include substance-specific dummies. Hence, the conclusion that capacity does not have a positive effect on compliance seems highly robust.
Can the temporal dimension explain noncompliance?
This section reviews compliance-relevant changes from 1999 (when Gothenburg was adopted)
to 2010 (Gothenburg's deadline year) and asks if they were sufficiently significant to explain instances of noncompliance with the Gothenburg Protocol.
6.1 Can energy consumption developments explain noncompliance with NOx targets? Amann et al. (1999) 22 identify population size, GDP per capita, the number of vehicles, and energy consumption as major determinants of NOX emissions. However, because GDP per capita, population size, and the number of vehicles largely influence emissions through energy consumption, I examine only energy consumption developments.
23
Evidence presented in Table 4 may be used to examine (1) Thus, this analysis suggests that only two of nine NOX noncompliance cases may be explained by unexpectedly high energy consumption (the second case being Norway).
Previous underestimation of NOX emissions
If national authorities wrongfully believe that they are on an emissions trajectory consistent with compliance (or that compliance already has been reached), they may not commission policies that otherwise have been put in place. Hence, underestimation of emissions may be a barrier to compliance.
Over the last couple of decades, it has been discovered repeatedly that diesel vehicles emit more NOX than previously thought (UNECE 2003 , European Commission 2017 27 I include only states that were noncompliant with their 2010 NOx Gothenburg target.
28 Actual emissions are here defined as the estimates reported in 2015. Obviously, there is an artificiality to this classification, since even recent emissions estimates may subject to change because of new scientific evidence. However, since estimates from 2015 are derived from the presently best available scientific knowledge, I use 2015 estimates as baseline. In the cases of Norway and Sweden, Table 5 The appendix includes tables with estimates of NOX emissions for other years than 1999.
Except from the cases of Belgium and Luxembourg (discussed above), Tables A3-A6 lead to   the same conclusions as Table 5. 6.3 Change in the drivers of NMVOC emissions
As Tables 1 and 6 show, three states have not complied with their NMVOC targets -Belgium, Denmark, and Germany. The number of registered vehicles is the only driver of NMVOC emissions for which Amann et al. (1999) include projections.
The entries in Table 6 were arrived at in a manner similar to that used for Table 4 Table 6 .
As shown by the far-right column in Table 6 , none of the three instances of NMVOC noncompliance can be explained by the temporal dimension. Belgium and Germany had fewer vehicles in 2010 than projected, and Denmark's noncompliance (40,400 tonnes) far exceeds the emissions attributable to unexpectedly high vehicle numbers. (CEIP 2015) . Road transport data from CEIP 2016.
6.4 Change in the drivers of ammonia emissions Table 7 shows projected (from Amannn et al. 1999 ) and observed fertilizer use in 2010 of the eight parties that did not comply with their 2010 ammonia targets. Except for Switzerland, all parties consumed less nitrogen fertilizer in 2010 than projected. Thus, the evidence suggests that the temporal dimension cannot explain these cases of noncompliance. In contrast, for Switzerland the observed consumption exceeds the projection by almost 70%, and Switzerland's ammonia emissions were only 1% above the target (see also Table 1 )., Thus, the temporal dimension appears to be a plausible explanation of Switzerland's noncompliance. Table 8 summarizes my conclusions concerning the temporal dimension's ability to explain the noncompliance with the Gothenburg Protocol. Of the 21 targets that were not complied with, four are fully explained by unexpected developments between Gothenburg's adoption and deadline. Some of the noncompliance of two large NOX emitters, France and Germany, is explained, yet five other cases of noncompliance with NOX targets are not accounted for at all.
Thus, although Chayes and Chayes' third factor has more explanatory power than the first two, it leaves most of the observed noncompliance unaccounted for. 
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the three factors specified by Chayes and Chayes cannot explain very much of the noncompliance with the Gothenburg Protocol.
The evidence examined to test the ambiguity explanation is clear: Doubt or disagreement over obligations has not caused the quite widespread noncompliance with the Gothenburg Protocol.
The analysis of the capacity explanation is also unambiguous, as the hypothesis derived from we claim that the enforcement school provides a better explanation of (non)compliance than the management school does.
Appendix to "Can the Management School Explain
Noncompliance with International Environmental Agreements?" Sensitivity check: Statistical assessments of the effect of capacity on compliance Table A1 shows the results of additional OLS regressions using another measure from Worldwide Government Indicators (WGI) to operationalize capacity. According to the World Bank's description, Regulatory Quality "reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development." Once again, I find no positive relationship between capacity and compliance. Table A2 shows the results of a final robustness check (Model 13). Here, I have included dummies for each substance that Gothenburg regulates. Again, the effect of capacity is negative and statistically significant. Since Model 13 includes dummies for all regulated substances except sulphur, the substance dummy estimates can be interpreted as the difference in compliance between the substance concerned and sulphur. As all Gothenburg parties complied with their sulphur targets (see Table 1 in the main document), it comes as no surprise that all substance dummy estimates shown in Model 16 are negative. 29 -20 -16.7 -29.4 -11.9 -5.7 -4 Numbers in italics are the differences between the 2015 estimate and the estimate from the year at the column header. -1 Numbers in italics are the differences between the 2015 estimate and the estimate from the year at the column header.
Additional comparisons of emissions estimates over time

